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Class Actions
by Thomas M. Byrne*
In terms of significant class action decisions, 2006 was one of the
Eleventh Circuit's busiest years in recent memory. Among other rulings,
the court established the ground rules for Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(2)' classes. The year also presented the court with its
first opportunity to address some of the many interpretative
questions
2
posed by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA").
I.

RULE 23(B)(2)

The Eleventh Circuit entered the controversy on the requirements for
certification of a Rule 23(b)(2)' class in Heffner v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Alabama, Inc.,4 which was probably the court's most significant class action decision during 2006. The court accepted a Rule 23(f)'
petition for permission to appeal the district court's certification of a
* Partner in the law firm of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Notre Dame (A.B., cum laude, 1978; J.D., magna cur laude, 1981). Law
clerk to the Hon. Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Hon. Morey L. Sear of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(b)(2). This rule provides for class certification where Rule 23(a)'s
requirements are met and "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." Id.
2. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
3. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(b)(2).
4. 443 F.3d 1330 (lth Cir. 2006), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 186 F. App'x 983
(11th Cir. 2006). The opinion was written by Judge Ed Carnes, joined by Judge William
H. Pryor, Jr. and District Judge J. Owen Forrester, sitting by designation.
5. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f). This rule provides:
A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a
district court granting or denying class action certification under this rule if
application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of
appeals so orders.

Id.
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Rule 23(b)(2) class of as many as 240,000 participants and beneficiaries
of hundreds of group health plans administered by Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Alabama. The underlying claim was that Blue Cross violated
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")7 by imposing
deductibles that were contrary to the summary plan descriptions. Blue
Cross 8 contended that the "no deductible" language was a scrivener's
error.
The court began its analysis by again pointing out that while a court
should not have to determine the merits of a claim at the class
certification stage, it is appropriate to consider the merits to the degree
necessary to determine whether Rule 23's requirements are satisfied.9
The court observed that "[alt first blush, plaintiffs' claims to recover
their deductibles and to obtain other equitable relief seemed to fit neatly
into the Rule 23(b)(2) paradigm."'0 But that was as good as it got for
the plaintiffs. Because reliance was a critical element of the plaintiffs'
case, the court determined that Rule 23(b)(2) class certification was
inappropriate." Relying on its prior ERISA decisions,"2 the court held
that the beneficiary must prove reliance on the summary plan description to prevent an employer from enforcing the contrary terms of a
benefit plan."
The court noted that the formal plan documents
showed, without dispute, that none of the plans provided deductible-free
coverage. 4 The court rejected the merits-rooted contention that the
summary plan description was "the only ERISA plan document that
counts,"" an example of how merits determinations necessarily frame
arguments about class certification.

6. Heffner, 443 F.3d at 1333.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
8. Heffner, 443 F.3d at 1333-35.
9. The court cited its prior decision in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 n.15 (11th Cir. 2003). Heffner, 443 F.3d at 1337. The merits
versus class certification line of demarcation has proven to be one of the most difficult
problems in class action law. The Second Circuit's decision addressing the issue in In re
Initial Public Offering SecuritiesLitigation, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006), was probably the
most significant class action decision of 2006.
10. Heffner, 443 F.3d at 1340.
11. Id.
12. Liberty Life Assurance Co. v. Kennedy, 358 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2004); Buce
v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 247 F.3d 1133, 1155-56 (11th Cir. 2001); Collins v. Am. Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 105 F.3d 1368, 1371 (11th Cir. 1997); Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574,
1579 (11th Cir. 1992); McKnight v. S. Life & Health Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th
Cir. 1985).
13. Heffner, 443 F.3d at 1340.
14. Id. at 1341.
15. Id.
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The court noted that it had previously held that the reliance element
of a class claim presents individualized proof problems that preclude
class certification in Rule 23(b)(3) 6 class actions but had not decided
that issue in a Rule 23(b)(2) case.17 On that issue, the court agreed
with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.1" that
Rule 23(b)(2) certification was also precluded in such situations. 9 The
court reasoned that even if the plaintiff proved he purchased prescription drugs in reliance on the summary plan description of the deductible
arrangement, only he would be entitled to relief on that proof; other
class members would not.20 Therefore, Rule 23(b)(2)'s requirement that
"[fWinal injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect
to the class as a whole" be appropriate would not be met.2' The court
concluded that "[clertification under Rule 23(b)(2) is proper when the
relief sought necessarily affects all class members."22
The court
determined that injunctive or declaratory relief-and any other equitable
relief of a monetary nature based on it-would not automatically flow to
the class as a whole even if the named plaintiffs succeeded in proving
reliance in their case.23 The court expressed no opinion on a footnote
in the district court's opinion which stated that a class certification
would also be proper under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(3).24 The court
stated only that the class could not be certified on those grounds
"without more analysis and justification."2 5
Outside the context of the prototypical civil rights injunction, courts
have struggled with the requirements for certification of a Rule 23(b)(2)
class. Many Rule 23(b)(2) declaratory-injunctive relief classes have
failed when monetary relief is also sought, on the ground that the
injunctive or declaratory relief does not predominate over the monetary
relief.26 The circuits are split, however, on the standard for such

16. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
17. Heffner, 443 F.3d at 1344.
18. 231 F.3d 970, 978 (5th Cir. 2000).
19. Heffner, 443 F.3d at 1344.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)). The court cited favorably Jones v. American
GeneralLife & Accident Insurance Co., 213 F.R.D. 689, 702 (S.D. Ga. 2002), a decision to
the same effect. Heffner, 443 F.3d at 1344.
22. Heffner, 443 F.3d at 1345.
23. Id. at 1344.
24. Id. at 1345.
25. Id. at 1346.
26. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998); Coleman
v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002); Holmes v. Cont'l Can Co.,
706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir. 1983).
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predominance. v Where differences in proof or individualized issues
exist pertaining to each class member, courts have rejected certification
on several rationales, including failure to meet Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement,28 a lack of "cohesiveness,"29 or failure to meet Rule
23(b)(2)'s requirement that the relief apply to the class as a whole.30
In Heffner the Eleventh Circuit joined the latter camp 3 even though
the language of Rule 23(b)(2) requires a discerning eye to detect a
requirement that individualized issues relating to proof of entitlement
to relief must not predominate. Rule 23(b)(2), however, does seem to be
a somewhat more analytically sound source for such a requirement than
the alternative of a more rigorous reading of Rule 23(a)(2)'s3 2 usually
lax commonality requirement that would apply only to (b)(2) classes.
After Heffner, it seems that plaintiffs hoping to find an easier road to
class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) will find disappointment in the
Eleventh Circuit.
II. THE CAFA TRIo
CAFA,33 which revolutionized federal jurisdiction over class actions,
became effective on February 18, 2005. 3' The first of the court's trio of
published 2006 CAFA decisions was Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc.,"'

27. Compare Allison, 151 F.3d at 415 ("monetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class
actions unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief"), and Jefferson
v. Ingersoll Intl, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999) (same), and Murray v. Auslander,
244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001) (same), with Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.
Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001). See also Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214,
1236 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming (b)(2) certification of employment discrimination claims,
including claims for punitive damages, based on the plaintiffs' testimony that their
"primary intention" in bringing the action was to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief).
28. Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 238-39 (W.D. Tex.
1999) (finding commonality lacking in employment discrimination action where challenged
decisions were made locally and under various sets of criteria); Appleton v. Deloitte &
Touche L.L.P., 168 F.R.D. 221, 231 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (same).
29. Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1998); see also In re
MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("'[Tlhe cohesiveness
requirement is greater in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action [than in a 23(b)(3) action], because
unnamed class members are bound by the action without the opportunity to opt out.'"
(alteration in original) (quoting AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3d § 51:55 (2002));
Thompson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544, 557 (D. Minn. 1999).
30. Bolin, 231 F.3d at 978.
31. Heffner, 443 F.3d at 1344.
32. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(2).
33. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
34. Id.
35. 449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2006). The court's opinion was written by Judge R. Lanier
Anderson III. The opinion was joined by Judges Gerald B. Tjoflat and Joel F. Dubina.
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in which the district court had remanded a class action to Alabama state
court on the basis of CAFA's "local controversy" exception to CAFA
jurisdiction. 36 The court first considered a procedural point-CAFA's
requirement that a court of appeals that accepts a discretionary appeal
of an order remanding a removed class action must complete all action
on the appeal not later than sixty days after the date on which the
appeal was filed.3 7 The court held that the sixty-day period began to
run from the date when the court of appeals granted the application to
appeal.3" The court reasoned that a request for appeal under CAFA
was subject to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,39
which governs discretionary appeals.40 That rule provides that the
order granting permission to appeal serves as the date of the notice of
appeal for purposes of calculating time under the federal appellate
rules.4 The court noted that its holding was consistent with the views
of every other circuit to address the issue.4 2
Having determined that it complied with the sixty-day requirement,
the court considered burden of proof questions.43
CAFA's "local
controversy" exception provides that a court shall decline to exercise
jurisdiction over a class action otherwise covered by CAFA if: (1) more
than two-thirds of the members of the proposed plaintiff class are
citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed; (2) at least
one forum-state defendant is a defendant from whom significant relief
is sought by members of the plaintiff class; (3) that forum-state
defendant's conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted; and
(4) the principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct were
incurred in the forum state. 44 The court noted that CAFA's language
favors federal jurisdiction over class actions and that its legislative
history suggests that Congress intended the local controversy exception

36. Id. at 1164.
37. Id. at 1162.
38. Id.
39. FED. R. App. P. 5.
40. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1162.
41. Id. (citing FED. R. APP. P. 5(d)(2)).
42. Id. at 1163 (citing Patterson v. Dean Morris, L.L.P., 444 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2006);
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., 435 F.3d 1140, 1145
(9th Cir. 2006); see also Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 (10th Cir.
2005)).
43. Id. at 1164.
44. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4)(A) (West 2006). The local controversy exception also
requires that "during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other
class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of
the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons." Id.
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"to be a narrow one." 45 The court agreed with the district court that
the plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing that they fell within
CAFA's local controversy exception.4" The court also pointed out that
CAFA does not change the traditional rule that the party seeking to
remove (that is, the defendant) bears the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction.4 7
The parties did not dispute that the defendants carried the burden of
establishing that the action met CAFA's basic jurisdictional requirements; the matter in controversy exceeded $5 million and minimal
diversity existed between the plaintiffs and defendants.4" The court
noted that placing the burden of proof for the "local controversy"
exception on the plaintiff was appropriate because the plaintiff was in
the best position to know about the composition of the plaintiff class,
having defined it.49 In further support of its opinion, the court cited
cases involving actions removed by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC") in which the Eleventh Circuit had held that the
burden of establishing the "state action" exception to federal jurisdiction
shifted to the party objecting to the FDIC's removal. ° The court
determined that CAFA's statutory framework is very similar to the FDIC
removal statute.5 ' While the court noted it was the first circuit to
address the local controversy exception burden requirement,52 other
courts have since agreed with Evans.53
The court then turned to the merits of the exception as applied to the
case before it.54 The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove that more than two-thirds of the proposed class members were
Alabama citizens."5 The complaint alleged environmental harms from
eighteen defendants extending over a period of at least eighty-five
years.5 " The plaintiffs submitted an affidavit showing that of the 5,200

45. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1163. The local controversy exception can also be satisfied by
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (West 2006), but that subparagraph was not involved in Evans.
46. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1164.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1164 n.3.
50. Id. (citing Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773 (11th Cir. 2005);
Lazuka v. FDIC, 931 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1991)).
51. Id. at 1164-65.
52. Id. at 1165.
53. Frazier v. Pioneer Americas, LLC, 455 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2006); see Hart v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 457 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2006); Serrano v. 180
Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007).
54. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1165.
55. Id.

56. Id.
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known class members, almost ninety-four percent were Alabama
residents.5 7 However, the court concluded that the underlying methodology was defective because it provided no information about how the
persons interviewed were selected and thus provided no reliable
information about the extremely broad class.5"
The court also held that the plaintiffs failed to prove the "significant
defendant" prong of the local controversy exception.59 The district court
had held that U.S. Pipe, an Alabama corporation, was a significant
defendant. The plaintiffs relied on their complaint and a supporting
affidavit by an attorney to establish U.S. Pipe's significance as a
defendant.6 ° But the Eleventh Circuit determined that the affidavit did
not "provide any enlightenment at all with respect to the significance of
the relief that is sought against U.S. Pipe, or its comparative significance relative to the relief sought from the other seventeen named codefendants."6 1 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' evidence offered
no insight into "whether U.S. Pipe played a significant role in the
alleged environmental contamination, as opposed to a lesser role, or even
a minimal role." 2 The court also noted that the limited available facts
supported an inference that U.S. Pipe was indeed not a significant
defendant as its two facilities in the affected area were either long since
closed or somewhat remote from the area occupied by most of the
identified class members.6
The court concluded that the district court
had erred in remanding the case to state court.6 The case suggests
that the "significance" of a defendant will be considered in light of both
the depth of the defendant's alleged involvement and the defendant's
significance relative to the other defendants.
A few weeks after Evans, another panel of the court issued another
CAFA jurisdictional decision in Miedema v. Maytag Corp.6" The issue
in Miedema was whether the defendant had carried its burden of
But before
establishing CAFA's basic jurisdictional requirements. 6
turning to that issue, the court addressed a CAFA anomaly.67 Literal-

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1167.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1167-68.
64. Id. at 1168.
65. 450 F.3d 1322 (lth Cir. 2006). The opinion for the court was authored by Judge
Charles R. Wilson and joined by Judges Ed Carnes and William H. Pryor, Jr.
66. Id. at 1325.
67. Id. at 1326.
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ly, CAFA permits a court of appeals to accept an application to appeal
if the application is made to the court of appeals "'not less than seven
days after entry of the [district court's] order.'"6" The court joined other
circuits in reading-this language as a typographical error, so that "less"
should be read as "more" to avoid an absurd result.69
The defendant argued that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove
that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking.70 As the Evans panel had
done, the court rejected that argument, joining the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits.71 The class action had been filed in Florida state court,
alleging that Maytag-manufactured ranges and ovens contained a
defective part. The plaintiff asserted that there were thousands of class
members and made claims for negligence, breach of express warranty,
and unfair trade practices.7" The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the
district court properly required the defendant, when the plaintiff had not
pled a specific amount of damages, to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional
amount. 73 When the jurisdictional amount is not apparent from the
complaint, the court is to look to the notice of removal and may require
that evidence relevant to the amount in controversy be adduced.74
Maytag's notice of removal relied on a declaration that a total of 6,729
models of the ranges and ovens identified in the complaint were sold in
Florida and that the total value of the ranges exceeded $5 million.7"
The district court, however, found that the plaintiff did not claim that
all ranges or models identified in the complaint contained the defect. 6
Maytag argued that the district court improperly relied on a postremoval class definition, which the Eleventh Circuit agreed could not be
considered in determining subject matter jurisdiction at the time of
removal.77 The court, however, was not convinced that the district court
actually relied on the post-removal definition and disregarded that
contention. 78 The court observed that the Maytag declaration offered

68. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.S. § 1453(c)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006)).
69. Id. (citing Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1093 n.2; Amalgamated Transit Union, 435 F.3d
at 1146, reh'g en banc denied, 2006 WL 1525316 (9th Cir. May 31, 2006) (per curiam)).
70. Id. at 1328.
71. Id. (citing Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446,448 (7th Cir. 2005);
Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)).
72. Id. at 1324-25.
73. Id. at 1330.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1330-31.
76. Id. at 1331.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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no explanation of how the 6,729 ranges and ovens had a total value
exceeding $5 million.7 9 The declarant was deposed, and it appeared
that the value was derived from the most recent suggested retail price
for each model type at issue; however, there was no link between the
suggested retail price and the damages sought.8" The court also noted
that the 6,729 figure was not based on actual sales data but was an
extrapolation from Maytag's receipt of 2,943 product registrations from
Florida consumers of the range and oven models at issue.8 The court
concluded that the district court did not err when it found that "great
uncertainty remained about the amount
in controversy [and] resolved
82
that uncertainty in favor of remand."
In Tmesys, Inc. v. Eufaula Drugs, Inc.,8 the Eleventh Circuit
accepted a petition for discretionary review of a remand order pursuant
to CAFA's provision for such review.84 After deciding that it had
jurisdiction to consider the discretionary appeal, even though the district
court had determined that CAFA did not apply, the court affirmed the
district court's determination that state law governs when an action is
commenced for CAFA purposes.85 The district court found that the
plaintiff filed its complaint on February 14, 2005, which was prior to
CAFA's effective date of February 18, 2005. Therefore, the district court
found no jurisdictional basis to remove the case under CAFA.8" The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's reasoning that Alabama
law established that the action was commenced prior to the effective
date of CAFA, even though the defendant was not served until after
CAFA's effective date.87
III.

EFFECT OF PARALLEL OR SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION

In two cases, the court considered complex questions arising from the
impact of a class action on parallel or subsequent proceedings. In both
cases, the court rejected attempts to enjoin the other proceedings. The

79. Id.
80. Id. at 1331-32.
81. Id. at 1332.
82. Id. For another recent case in which the defendant failed to establish CAFA's
jurisdictional amount, see Condes v. State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co., No. 06C-4607, 2007 WL 317037 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2007).
83. 462 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2006). The panelists were Judges Stanley F. Birch, Jr.,
Ed Carnes, and Frank M. Hull.
84. Id. at 1319 (citing 28 U.S.C.S. § 1453(c)(1)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1318.
87. Id. at 1318, 1319.
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first case, Burr & Forman v. Blair,8 produced no majority opinion.
Judge Tjoflat wrote a lengthy opinion, in which Judge Cox and District
Judge Lloyd George, sitting by designation, declined to join.89 At the
root of the case was an agreement between lawyers to share attorney
fees that might be awarded for representing the plaintiffs in two class
actions. Two of the lawyers who were parties to the agreement sued the
Burr & Forman law firm, which was also a party, for breach of contract
in an Alabama circuit court. Burr & Forman then removed the case to
district court. The district court remanded the case to the state court for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court, however, exercised
supplemental jurisdiction over the contract claim between the lawyers
in connection with final disbursement of attorney fees from the federal
class action settlement fund. The district court then went on to deny
any contract claim under the letter agreement. Notwithstanding the
district court's order, the two lawyers continued to prosecute their
contract action in state court.90 Citing the All Writs Act9 1 and the
Anti-Injunction Act 92 for authority, the district court entered an order
preliminarily enjoining
the two lawyers from participating in any further
93
state court litigation.
Judge Tjoflat noted that the All Writs Act authorized the issuance of
writs to protect "'not only ongoing proceedings, but [also] potential
'
future proceedings, as well as already issued orders and judgments.'"94
Judge Tjoflat noted further that "[t]he power to issue writs under the
Act is not circumscribed by the identity of the parties immediately before
the court; at the court's discretion, writs may be issued to third parties
who are in a position to frustrate a court's administration of its
jurisdiction."9 5 The Anti-Injunction Act, Judge Tjoflat wrote, "serves as
a check on the broad authority recognized by the All Writs Act."96 The
Anti-Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from utilizing their authority
to stay state court proceedings unless one of three narrow exceptions is
met.9" Two of those exceptions were potentially relevant in Blair: the
exception for district court orders "'necessary in aid of its jurisdiction'"

88. 470 F.3d 1019 (11th Cir. 2006).
89. Id. at 1021, 1036.
90. Id. at 1021-22.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
93. Burr & Forman, 470 F.3d at 1022.
94. Id. at 1026 (quoting May v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th
Cir. 2004)).
95. Id. at 1026-27.
96. Id. at 1027.
97. Id.
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and the exception "'to protect or effectuate its judgments.' 9
Judge
Tjoflat observed that the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception
is invoked in two separate situations.99 The first situation arises where
a federal court in an in rem proceeding acquires jurisdiction over the res
before an action involving the same res is brought in state court. 100
The other situation arises where "enjoining the state court proceeding is
necessary to protect an earlier federal court injunction."0 '
The
general rule is still, however, that an injunction cannot be issued to
prevent a state action in personam involving the same subject matter
from proceeding at the same time.' 2
Neither scenario was present in Blair, according to Judge Tjoflat.' °3
0 4
The two lawyers' contract action was not an in rem proceeding.
Judge Tjoflat rejected the argument that two prior decisions'
stood
for the proposition that the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception
authorizes a federal court to issue injunctions in all cases where it has
retained jurisdiction to enforce a judgment incorporating a complex
settlement.0 6 He wrote that "[flor an injunction properly to issue, the
matter in controversy in the federal court proceeding must be 'the
virtual equivalent' of a controversy over disputed res in an in rem
proceeding and the state court proceeding must constitute a threat to the
federal court's resolution of that controversy."' 7 Judge Tjoflat noted
that the two lawyers' contract action against Burr & Forman did not
attack the substance of the federal judgment or threaten the plaintiffs'
entitlement to their judgment. 0
Judge Tjoflat then turned to the "relitigation" exception, by which the
court is permitted to protect or effectuate its judgments.0 9 An injunction under that exception is appropriate where the state law claims
would be precluded by res judicata."° Judge Tjoflat concluded that
the relitigation exception did not apply, reasoning that the district court

98. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283).
99. Id. at 1028.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1029.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1032-33.
104. Id. at 1032.
105. Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1470-71 (11th Cir. 1993); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 880-82 (11th Cir. 1989).
106. Burr & Forman,470 F.3d at 1032.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1032-33.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1033.
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did not have jurisdiction to issue the order denying the two lawyers'
attorney fees claims because the district court had remanded the case to
state court for lack of diversity jurisdiction.'
Concurring in the result only, Judge Cox stated that he agreed with
much of Judge Tjoflat's opinion, but tersely concluded that it decided
"more than we must decide." 2 Judge Cox agreed that the district
court had no jurisdiction over the claims that were the subject of the
remand." 3 Hence, neither exception to the Anti-Injunction Act could
apply, as the court had no jurisdiction."1 4 The unique circumstances
giving rise to the case may have been a factor in Judge Cox's reluctance
to join in a lengthy opinion covering complex subjects: the district court
found it had no jurisdiction over a state court action, yet then proceeded
to enjoin it.
The Eleventh Circuit considered a conflict between a federal class
action and a state court class action in In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales,
Inc."' This time, Judge Tjoflat wrote for a unanimous panel. The
case involved a group of heavy truck dealers who brought an action
against Ford Motor Company for breach of their dealer agreements with
Ford and for violations of federal law. The district court denied their
motion for class certification. While their individual cases were being
prepared for trial, one of the unnamed class members filed a putative
class action in Ohio state court that was practically identical to the
claims pending before the district court. The Ohio court then certified
the class that the district court had refused to certify. The plaintiffs in
the federal action, who were also class members in the Ohio case, then
moved to dismiss their case against Ford in the district court. The
district court denied their motion and granted Ford's motion to enjoin
the Ohio plaintiff from prosecuting the Ohio state court action and to
enjoin the federal plaintiffs from participating in the Ohio action. The
plaintiffs in the federal action and the plaintiff in the Ohio action
separately appealed the district court's injunction." 6
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the injunction. "' On appeal, the Ohio
plaintiff contended that it never appeared before the district court and
that the court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin it from prosecuting the Ohio

111. Id. at 1034-35.
112. Id. at 1036 (Cox, J., specially concurring).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 471 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2006). The panel consisted of Judges Gerald B. Tjoflat,
Emmett R. Cox, and District Judge Lloyd D. George, sitting by designation. The author's
law firm was co-counsel for Ford Motor Company in this action.
116. Id. at 1236.
117. Id.
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action.118 The Eleventh Circuit held that by filing a successful motion
to intervene, the Ohio plaintiff acquiesced in personal jurisdiction in the
district court." 9 The court determined that allowing the intervention
was in fact erroneous but that any error was invited by the Ohio
120
plaintiff's willful submission to the district court's jurisdiction.
The court then considered the injunction itself, which the district court
had found to fall within the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" and
"relitigation" exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act's bar on injunctions
of state court actions. 2 ' The court held that the injunction was
unnecessary to protect the district court's jurisdiction and specifically
rejected the applicability of the "complex multi-state litigation" exception
(an issue discussed in Judge Tjoflat's opinion in Blair).'22 The court
further held that the Ohio litigation "would not displace or frustrate the
district court's management of the case now pending before it." 23 The
court also rejected the applicability of the relitigation exception,
concluding that there was insufficient evidence of finality in the district
court's denial of class certification in the federal action. 124
The court labored to distinguish the Seventh Circuit's decision in In
25
re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liability Litigation,
which enjoined the prosecution of state class actions after the denial of
certification of a nationwide class. 126
The court opined that the
Seventh Circuit in that case "was giving preclusive effect to its own
judgment [rejecting class certification], not to the district court's order
on class certification."12' The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that Rule
23(c)( 1)128 "specifically empowers district courts to alter or amend class
' 29
certification orders 'at any time prior to a decision on the merits."
The court thus determined that finality was lacking even though the
district court had rejected the dealers' motion for reconsideration of the

118. Id. at 1245.
119. Id. at 1248.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1250.
122. Id. at 1250-53.
123. Id. at 1252. The court again distinguished Battle, 877 F.2d 877 and Wesch, 6 F.3d
1465. Id.
124. Id. at 1253-54.
125. 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Bayshore Ford, 471 F.3d at 1254 n.39.
126. In re BayshoreFord,471 F.3d at 1255 (citing In re Bridgestone/Firestone,333 F.3d
at 765-66).
127. Id. at 1254 n.39.
128. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1).
129. In re BayshoreFord, 471 F.3d at 1254 (quoting Prado-Steinman v. Bush, 221 F.3d
1266, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000)).
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denial of class certification." 0 The court noted that while the district
court found no legal basis for reconsideration, its order did not mention
131
whether a different factual basis could produce a different result.
Thus, having determined that neither of the exceptions to the AntiInjunction Act applied, the court concluded that the district court abused
its discretion by halting prosecution of the Ohio action.3 2
The court then turned to the district court's injunction of the plaintiff
dealers' participation in the Ohio class. 33 The court reasoned that the
district court's authority for such an injunction must be derived from the
All Writs Act. 114 The court observed no circumstances that would
indicate how the dealers' membership in the Ohio class would pose a
threat to the district court's management of the litigation before it. 3 '
Again distinguishing the Seventh Circuit's Bridgestone/Firestone
decision, the court concluded that the district court's class certification
denial lacked the finality needed to serve as the basis for an injunction
under the All Writs Act.'
The court indeed saw the denial of class
certification as an invitation to the plaintiffs "to repair to another
forum."3 7 The court's opinion evinces a reluctance to ascribe preclusive effect to class certification orders, but is unlikely to be the final
word on the subject.
IV.

CLASS SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS
opinion 3 5 in

In an unpublished
Brown ex rel. O'Neil v.Bush,3 9 the
court considered the requirements for timely intervention in a class
action. 4 ° The proposed intervenors were objectors to a class action
settlement brought against the governor of Florida and various state
officials. The original plaintiffs were people with mental disabilities who
130. Id. at 1253-54.
131. Id. at 1254.
132. Id. at 1255.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1257.
136. Id. at 1255-57.
137. Id. The court, however, refused to issue a writ of mandamus to the district court
to permit the dismissal of their federal action, noting that a plaintiff holds no right to such
dismissal without prejudice. Id. at 1258-59. "Ifnothing else, that the parties' extensive
discovery had concluded and the case was ready for trial counseled the denial of the
Dealers' motion." Id. at 1259.
138. 11TH CiR. R. 36-2 provides that the court's "[u]npublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority."
139. 194 F. App'x 879 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The panel consisted of Judges Joel
F. Dubina, Phyllis A. Kravitch, and District Judge Richard Mills, sitting by designation.
140. Id. at 882.
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sought less restrictive community-based placements rather than
placements in residential institutions. As part of a class settlement, the
parties agreed to procure community-based placements and to close two
residential facilities. The objectors, residents of one of the facilities that
was to be closed, were not members of the class. The objectors saw a
newspaper article reporting the potential closure of the facility. At the
scheduled fairness hearing, the objectors' counsel asserted his clients'
objections to closing the facility, orally moved to intervene to contest the
settlement agreement, and sought decertification of the class.'41
The Eleventh Circuit noted that all of the objectors either learned of
the facility's possible closure from a newspaper article published several
months before the fairness hearing or through a court-ordered notice to
all residents and their families and guardians, which was mailed seven
weeks before the fairness hearing.142 The court stated that "the courtordered notification explicitly stated that all objections must be filed by
November 24[,J ....
[but] the [objectors ... did not file a motion to
intervene before the November 24 deadline for objections."'" Instead,
the objectors waited until the fairness hearing was in progress, at which
time they made an oral motion to intervene.'" The court held that
"seven weeks is not too short of a time for an interested party to file a
motion to intervene." 145 The court also concluded that it was not an
abuse of discretion for the district court to find that the potential
prejudice to the objectors from the denial of their motion to intervene did
not outweigh the significant prejudice to the parties that would result
from allowing the intervention. 41 The court noted that the objectors
were still able to present their concerns to the court at the fairness
hearing and could pursue actions under existing law to protect any right
they may have to continue to reside in the facility.147 Considering
these factors, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the
motion was untimely and determined that there was no abuse of
discretion in the denial of intervention. 14

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 880-81.
Id. at 882.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 883.
Id.
Id. at 883-84.

